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Abstract
This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialis-
tic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating 
Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I 
place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical 
and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incor-
porated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive 
science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued relevance, my main goal is to show 
how his scientifically informed account of perception and cognition combats skepti-
cism propagated by certain scientific visions, exacerbated by commonplace notions 
about mind, that jointly suggest that human beings lack genuine access to reality.
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i Introduction
Despite many competing theories of mind emerging since the beginning of the 
Modern era, most agree on basic points: that there are inner and outer worlds, 
and perception and cognition function to represent what the  organism  cannot 
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access directly. This generates an epistemological dualism of inner versus out-
er, which leads immediately to skepticism insofar as the world of represen-
tation is almost by definition one of appearance. Skepticism has accordingly 
been a defining issue of the Modern and Post-Modern era.
I do not attempt anything so audacious as overcoming problems with which 
Descartes and other Moderns left us, much less tritely rejecting them. Rather, 
I focus on how Modern ideas about mind, which are not necessarily wholly 
wrong, but too narrowly focused on what occurs inside the head, along with 
accompanying epistemological dualisms, remain even in some materialistic 
and hence ontologically anti-dualistic outlooks. I discuss how John Dewey, 
anticipating Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, lessened the 
divide between inner and outer by suggesting extra-neural mechanisms are 
involved in perception and cognition; and how, by showing active bodies can 
perform integrative operations traditionally attributed to “inner” mechanisms, 
he moved away from mind-body dualism and contemporary variants such as 
brain-body dualism. Throughout I locate Dewey’s thought in the context of 
scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and taken broadly to include the 
cognitive as well as more traditional sciences; and I consider how he incorpo-
rated the sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating recent 
developments in enactive cognitive science.
While I hope to thereby emphasize the continued relevance of Dewey, 
whom a number of scholars regard as prescient (see Schulkin, 2004; Rockwell, 
2005; Solymosi and Shook, 2013), my primary aim is to show how Dewey’s 
scientifically informed account of perception and cognition helps overcome 
skepticism propagated by certain scientific visions, exacerbated by Modern 
era ideas about mind, that together suggest that the individual subject lacks 
genuine access to reality. Dewey, for example, combated the sort of skepticism 
that holds color perception merely gives us a representation and not genuine 
qualities of things; or that we are deceived when we perceive things as solid 
since they are mostly made of space on an atomic level. Dewey saw such judg-
ments as arising from a failure to recognize that determinable aspects of real-
ity are products of relationships; and when registered by us, whether through 
perceptual faculties or scientific instruments, they are consequences of our 
 conduct, and accordingly should be judged from the standpoint of specific 
action-scenarios generating them. For reasons to be discussed, this suggests 
there is often no genuine conflict between scientific views and everyday ex-
periences, while simultaneously offering rigorous standards for weeding out 
ill-conceived ideas. It also supplies epistemic basis for both our experiences 
and scientific knowledge since both are products of changes occurring in our 
surroundings, as opposed to just our heads.
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ii Brain as Simulator
Models of mind and human physiology often reflect the scientific and tech-
nological zeitgeist of the times in which they are advanced. As John Daugman 
(2001) noted:
Theorizing about the brain and mind has been especially susceptible to 
sporadic reformulation in terms of the technological experience of the 
day. For example, the water technology of antiquity (fountains, pumps, 
water clocks) underlies … the Greek pneumatic concept of soul (pneuma) 
and the Roman physician Galen’s theory of the four humours; the clock-
work mechanisms proliferating during the Enlightenment are  ticking 
with seminal influence inside La Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine (1784); 
Victorian pressurized steam engines and hydraulic machines are churn-
ing underneath Freud’s hydraulic construction of the unconscious and 
its libidinal economy; the arrival of the telegraph provided Helmholtz 
with his basic neural metaphor, as did the relay circuits and solenoids for 
Hebb’s theory of memory; and so on (24; see also Schulkin, 2016, 8).
A dominant metaphor from the second half of the 20th century onward, though 
one under pressure in recent decades, is the computer. Though the technology 
is fairly new, a number of tenets in this metaphor, particularly in popularized 
versions, are about 500 years old.
The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman (2009, 2011; and Prakash 2014) 
supplies a recent example of the metaphor by comparing perception to ms 
 Windows and comparable programs that help us accomplish tasks while 
 unaware of the physical processes that run computers. Such programs guide us-
ers’ operations of the mouse, triggering complicated changes “inside the com-
puter, completely hidden from the user. Forcing the user to see the true causal 
chain would be an impediment, not a help” (Hoffman and Prakash, 2014, n.p.) 
because reports of voltage levels, magnetic fields and so on would be para-
lyzing and also irrelevant in most cases. For such reasons, interfaces not only 
fail to provide the truth; they keep it from us. According to Hoffman (2011), 
“[p]erceived space and time are simply the desktop of the perceptual interface 
of Homo sapiens. Objects, with their colors, shapes, textures, and motions, are 
simply the icons of our space-time desktop” (12). Because perceptual systems 
cost organisms valuable calories, “natural selection pressures perception to be 
quick and cheap” (11). As with computer interfaces, getting veridical percepts 
of the environment “is too expensive in time and energy. It is also not usually 
relevant, since utility, not truth,” is what matters (11). The reason, therefore, 
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that we rarely step in front of busses and do other reckless things “is the same 
reason one would not carelessly drag a file icon to the trashcan.” While “the 
shape and color of the file icon do not resemble anything about the true file,” 
dragging “the icon to the trash … [could cost] many hours of work. We know 
not to take the icons literally. … But we also know to take [them] seriously” (12). 
So similarly with perception. We take it seriously even though it is not veridi-
cal, at least this is what Hoffman’s theory contends.
Richard Dawkins provides another example of mind as computer as well 
as the skepticism-inducing scientism Dewey was trying to escape. While 
something of a caricature, even though Dawkins was in earnest, it provides 
an  illustrative case precisely because it is a caricature vis-à-vis mind as repre-
senting machine that typifies Modern era views that survive today. In his 2006 
The God Delusion, Dawkins wrote: “The human brain runs first-class simula-
tion software,” explaining by way of example that “[o]ur eyes don’t present to 
our brains a faithful photograph [or movie] of what is out there” (88). Instead, 
[o]ur brains construct a continuously updated model: updated by coded puls-
es chattering along the optic nerve” (88–89). Repeatedly emphasizing a digital, 
pulsing on-off picture, Dawkins supplied other examples of how the brain sim-
ulates experiences of what is not actually occurring in the world, for instance, 
describing separate harmonics that the brain synthesizes into the brassy or 
reedy timbres of trumpets or clarinets. His account of cognition mirrors his 
conception of perception. “Each of us builds, inside our head, a model of the 
world in which we find ourselves” (361), he said, adding that we are constrained 
by our evolutionary past. Consequently, the challenge is to move beyond “the 
minimal model of the world [that] our ancestors needed in order to survive in 
it” (361). Because our brains are “on-board computers, evolved to help us sur-
vive in a world … where the objects that mattered to our survival were neither 
very large nor very small” and “where things either stood still or moved slowly 
compared with the speed of light” (367), we struggle to imagine vast cosmic 
sizes or quantum strangeness, to picture atoms or electron zones and so on.
While arguing that people are mostly duped in their everyday perceptions 
and thoughts, Dawkins (2006) nonetheless insisted that something approach-
ing accurate representational knowledge is possible. Here too he invoked the 
concept of “simulation software.” Only in this instance he explained the brain 
can construct tolerably accurate models of the universe because scientific 
methodology, technological instruments and mathematics widen the slit of 
what he calls our “mental burka,” for example, allowing us to detect and under-
stand portions of the electromagnetic spectrum outside the visual range (see 
361–374). Human brains, on this view, “turn out to be powerful enough to ac-
commodate a much richer world model than the mediocre utilitarian one that 
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our ancestors needed in order to survive” (361–362). We can therewith come to 
understand the universe through what he called “a model-building enterprise” 
(361), and by means of this realize we are vastly mistaken in our everyday expe-
rience of the world. Again, Dawkins’s account of mind is somewhat  superficial 
and does not address the nuances and differences between, say, Hilary Put-
man, Jerry Fodor and Fred Dretske. Nevertheless it reflects academic posi-
tions that have gained traction, while also mirrored in popular views, whether 
conveyed in movies such as The Matrix (1999) or delivered by psychology and 
philosophy professors presenting the mind or brain as a world-representing 
machine; and despite being framed in the language of neuro- and computer 
science, the account offered by Dawkins, like that of Hoffman, parallels early 
Modern outlooks.
Dawkins and Hoffman’s views do so, most obviously, by emphasizing an 
inner-outer divide. While many take this divide for granted today, it has not 
always been so readily accepted. Hubert Dreyfus (2003), for example, observed 
that the Homeric Greeks regarded inner experience as an exceptional phenom-
enon, as evidenced by the fact that “Homer considered it one of Odysseus’s 
cleverest tricks that he could cry inwardly while his eyes remained [dry],” and 
noted further that there are few if any other references to inner experience 
in Homer’s works. Along similar lines, Dewey (1925) claimed that “inner ex-
perience” was a Modern era discovery (172), whereas to the ancient Greeks, 
“experience was the outcome of accumulation of practical acts, sufferings and 
perception gradually built up into the skill of the carpenter, shoemaker, pilot, 
farmer, general, and politician.” Having experience meant being experienced 
or skilled, so that “[t]here was nothing merely personal or subjective about 
it” (230; also see Crippen, 2014, 2016a, 2016b). This was the model that Dewey 
adopted, anticipating enactivists such as Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë, who, in 
their landmark 2001 article, proposed that perception is “the activity of explor-
ing the environment in ways mediated by knowledge of the relevant sensorimo-
tor contingencies” (943), so that “seeing is a way of acting” (939). On this view, 
which is also Dewey’s, a great deal of our perception occurs, to borrow from 
the title of Noë’s 2009 book, “out of our heads.”
A second and related way in which Dawkins’s and Hoffman’s stances resem-
ble early Modern views is that, while materialistic and therefore antagonistic 
towards mind-body dualism, they suggest we live in a world of mental appear-
ance and therewith retain epistemological dualism. The framing of Dawkins’s 
and Hoffman’s examples, despite occasional claims to the contrary, also as-
sumes there is more or less one reality; and, relatedly, that there is one truth 
on a given matter—something upon which even Descartes and Hume agreed 
despite differences elsewhere. Both accounts consequently assume there is a 
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world as it really is, and then our representations of it, which, by virtue of being 
representations, only give us the world as it appears.
iii Alternative Views
Anticipating the kind of dualisms that often follow from many contemporary 
materialist accounts, Dewey (1916), roughly a century ago, wrote:
The advance of physiology and the psychology associated with it have 
shown the connection of mental activity with that of the nervous system. 
Too often recognition of connection has stopped short at this point; the 
older dualism of soul and body has been replaced by that of the brain and 
the rest of the body (361).
Dewey of course recognized the importance of the brain, but he also advanced 
the view, as Merleau-Ponty (1945) would put it some years later, that the “body 
is not a collection of adjacent organs, but a synergic system, all the functions 
of which are exercised and linked together in the general action of being in the 
world” (272). Dewey, along with Merleau-Ponty, maintained we only perceive 
and cognize through bodily sensitivities and capacities coordinating into joint 
action. This includes real-time coordinations and also past ones through which 
we acquire habits that help us deal with things and indeed characterize how 
we perceive them; and, critically, capacities and sensitivities coordinate not 
on their own, but by synchronizing around environmental contours—points 
taken up in detail later. Dewey (1916), to be sure, granted that the nervous sys-
tem is crucial, but added that it
is only a specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily activities working 
together. Instead of being isolated from them, as an organ of knowing 
from organs of motor response, it is the organ by which they interact re-
sponsively with one another. The brain is essentially an organ for effect-
ing the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from 
the environment and responses directed upon it (361).
Crucially, moreover, “the adjusting is reciprocal; the brain not only enables or-
ganic activity to be brought to bear upon any object of the environment in 
response to a sensory stimulation, but this response also determines what the 
next stimulus will be” (361–362). As O’Regan and Noë (2001) observed, for ex-
ample, “seeing involves testing the changes that occur through eye, body, and 
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attention movements” (947), and the brain plays a role in these adjustments 
and therewith in determining what stimuli are received.
Dewey was not alone in emphasizing the brain since William James and 
numerous others in his day also did. Even Dewey’s emphasis on extra-neural 
mechanisms was emblematic of his time, despite also being forward thinking, 
insofar as others under the influence of Darwinism and the biological sciences 
were hinting at comparable positions. Francis Galton, in 1883, discussed an 
“incipient motor sense, not of the eyeballs only but of the muscles generally,” 
which he related to mental imagery (61). Edward Titchener (1909) similarly 
proposed that “[m]eaning is, originally, kinaesthesis; the organism faces the 
situation by some bodily attitude” (176). Some years later, Margaret Floy Wash-
burn, in her 1916 Movement and Mental Imagery: Outlines of a Motor Theory 
of the Complexer Mental Processes, positted that “the whole of the inner life is 
correlated with and de-pendent upon bodily movement” (xiii).1
That Dewey and his contempories proposed such ideas is remarkable in 
light of recent neuroscientific work, for as Jay Schulkin (2004) observed:
we now know that the head ganglia of motor control and the organization 
of movement and habit—the basal ganglia—is linked to a wide array of 
cognitive functions. They include language production, the paradigmatic 
example of a cognitive system […]. For example, syntax production for 
regular verbs […], the prediction of a probabilistic event […], the orga-
nization of specific movements […], and the appraisal of rewards … all 
involve the basal ganglia (18–19).
Schulkin also connected the late 19th and early 20th century emphasis on bodi-
ly activity to Darwinism (8), a point repeated by Kristof Nyiri (2014, 136, fn. 57). 
The theory stresses adaptation, something emphatically related to the body 
but also intelligence, thus providing a link between motoricity and mind. Of 
Dewey, Schulkin specifically noted that he
attempted to modify the idea of the reflex arc inherited from Descartes 
by building cognitive systems right into the reflex responses. This was 
a prescient orientation, for we have recognized that elementary motor 
control is embedded in cognitive systems that organize the structure of 
action (18; also see Rockwell, 2014).
1 Kristof Nyiri quoted the above-cited Galton, Titchener and Washburn passages in his plenary 
talk, Towards a Theory of Common-Sense Realism, presented at Visual Learning: Trust, Time, 
Tradition, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, November 13, 2015.
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In fact, it was more prescient than even this, since embodied cognitive scien-
tists and some phenomenologists have recognized the reverse, namely, that 
cognitive systems are embedded in motor activity, a point to which I now turn.
iv Dewey’s Embodied Theory of Perception and Recent Views
On Dewey’s account, perception involves an outward giving and giving into, 
or, as he put it, “an act of the going-out … in order to receive” (1934, 53). When 
reaching out to receive a wood carving, our fingers wrap around it, giving into 
its form. The carving, to borrow from Merleau-Ponty, “utilizes the time oc-
cupied by our tactile exploration or modulates the movement of our hand” 
(1945, 315), thereby patterning a perceptual experience. This idea, which has 
roots in many places, including C.S. Peirce’s (1878, 293) pragmatic maxim, is re-
peated by contemporary enactivists. For instance Erik Myin and Jan Degenaar 
(2014) observed that “tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined 
by particular patterns of experiences one has when engaging in such activi-
ties as squishing a sponge or pushing a brick wall” (91). Using an example of a 
bottle, Noë (2004) made a similar point, albeit one emphasizing engagement 
through understanding to an extent that makes radical enactivists such as 
Daniel Hutto and Myin (2013) uncomfortable. “The bottle as a whole is present 
to you,” wrote Noë, “not because you now represent the sense of having an in-
ternal model of it, but in the sense that you now understand the way in which 
it structures and controls your movements, and so your sensory stimulation.” 
Thus “[t]he content of your tactile experience is enacted by your exploratory 
movements (73).
Interestingly, the views advanced by Dewey and later by enactivists both 
affirm and denies tenets of competing empiricist and rationalist schools. That 
entities shape the hand’s actions and therewith experience does not mean the 
hand and more generally the human subject yield like clay, for they are con-
strained by their capacities and possibilities of action. So far this sounds like 
rationalism made bodily; notice, however, that actions in the world, acquired 
habits and skills, which Dewey and enactivists link to other perceptual modes 
such as vision, and which are rather unlike a priori mechanisms or traditional 
rational structures, are of primary importance. In pre-Modern philosophy, 
habit was often equated to experience, and in everyday language we say peo-
ple are experienced when they are skilled and have accumulated a history of 
doing. Thus, along empiricist lines, experience is given primacy. The subject, 
as Dewey (1934) summed up, again mixing ideas from both schools, “brings 
with it through its own structure, native and acquired, forces that play a part 
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in the interaction.” It “acts as well as undergoes, and its undergoings are not 
 impressions stamped upon an inert wax” (246), so that, to re-quote, percep-
tion is “an act of the going-out … in order to receive” (53). With endless minute 
variations and combinations of action, and with particularities of individual 
subjects and objects encountered, possibilities of action are unlimited in num-
ber. However, they are not unbounded in scope. Fingers cannot spin like drills: 
the subject enters each encounter already endowed with certain potentialities 
and consequently cannot enact any pattern whatever.
Thus Dewey—again, in company with recent enactivists—rejected the 
empiricist notion that the subject waits “passive and inert for something to 
impress itself upon it from without” (1920, 86). As Noë (2004) put it, “percep-
tion cannot be represented in terms of merely passive, and internal, processes” 
(11) since it is constituted through outward action. At the same time, Dewey’s 
and enactivist views challenge the position that subjects “project” perspec-
tives outwards, as if onto an empty screen. We cannot perceive or even think 
whatever we want because we cannot do whatever we want. Hence while the 
hand projects itself into objects in the sense of reaching out and pushing into 
them, it does not make things completely in its own image. In projecting out, 
it meets the countervailing press of objects and therewith things limiting its 
actions and positions adopted. So whereas one can roll bottles between one’s 
palms, the same action and hence same experience is impossible with cinder-
blocks. In this instance, therefore, it is a misnomer to say that what appears 
in experience is merely subjective, and the same, as will soon be seen, ap-
plies  elsewhere. It is a misnomer because the possibilities of action delimiting 
particular experiences are not merely conditioned upon the subject, but also 
upon objects encountered, and the experience is largely constituted through 
actions in the world.
Seen accordingly, perceived qualities are qualities of interactions that oc-
cur in the world, as opposed to mere subjective representations of it (Dewey, 
1925, 259; O’Regan and Noë, 2001, 960). Conceptually and phenomenologically, 
glassy smoothness is a property of the earlier mentioned bottle; yet in the cur-
rent context it is inseparable from the hand’s movements, save analytically. The 
property is inseparable because it is a consequence undergone, as Dewey (1934) 
would say (e.g., 44), in the course of an interaction—a consequence undergone 
when fingertips sweep over a surface that does not bite flesh. “We speak of 
perception and its object,” Dewey remarked. “But perception and its object are 
built up and completed in one and the same continuing operation” (177).
Here one perhaps wants to plead that the bottle really is smooth, and not 
just when touched—we can see its smoothness, for example. True enough. 
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Yet this is still to say it really is smooth within the context of particular 
 interactions—or, to put it another way, that the smoothness is an effect of 
 certain manipulations, and the effect is real. This is even so when the bottle 
meets the eye: the cornea bends light reflected from the bottle; the lens modi-
fies its path further by adjusting to bring the bottle into focus; and these modi-
fications are manipulations. Dewey (1920) made this point when he wrote that, 
while an astronomer cannot manipulate “stars themselves, he can at least by 
lens and prism change their light as it reaches the earth; he can lay traps for 
discovering changes [and therewith properties] that would otherwise escape 
notice” (113). Some might object that such modifications are trivial. Dewey 
(1934) would agree. He would add, however, that when we see the bottle, “[i]t 
is not just the visual apparatus” that becomes active, “but the whole organism” 
(122). Though researchers isolate “the optical apparatus … in anatomical dis-
section, it never functions in isolation. It operates in connection with the hand 
in reaching for things and in exploring their surface, in guiding manipulation 
of things, in directing locomotion” (100). The sight of a brimming beer cooler 
invites outstretched arms, grasping, twisting of caps, opening of mouths, tilt-
ing heads, gulping and more, all of which characterizes the experience. It is 
true we sometimes look without grabbing. Yet it is also true that we spend most 
of our waking life handling and ambulating, which means coordinating ac-
tions around objects and settings; and true, moreover, that our eyes participate 
in most of this.
For such reasons, the enactivist position, along with Dewey’s, suggests vi-
sual experience, like the earlier examples of tactile perception, is constituted 
through action. As Myin and Degenaar (2014) aptly explained:
Seeing a scene or an object is, in the sensorimotor approach, comparable 
to feeling a surface or object, where the experience is of the whole sur-
face or object, despite the fact that momentary tactile stimulation is lim-
ited to the fingertips making contact only at particular places.
[…]
For example, tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined 
by particular patterns of experiences one has when engaging in such 
activities as squishing a sponge or pushing a brick wall. Similarly, that 
 experiences of seeing differ as a class from experiences of hearing is due, 
according to the sensorimotor theory, to patterns of sensorimotor contin-
gencies specific to vision and audition, such as that in seeing, but not in 
hearing, stimulation from a particular source stops when one turns one’s 
head sideways, or closes one’s eyes (91).
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Or as Noë (2004) summarized:
Like touch, vision is active. … You and your eyes move around the scene 
the way you move your hands around the bottle. As in touch, the content 
of visual experience is not given all at once. We gain content by looking 
around just as we gain tactile content by moving our hands. You enact 
your perceptual content, through the activity of skillful looking (73)
Enactivists accordingly have maintained that visual perception, along with 
other modalities, “is constituted by the exercise of a range of sensorimotor 
skills” (Noë, 2004, 90), a claim supported with sensory substitution devices 
or experiments involving inverting glasses. With Paul Bach-y-Rita’s (e.g., 1983, 
1984; and Kercel, 2002) tactile-vision substitution system, as Noë (2004) ex-
plained, a head-mounted camera delivers stimulation via electrical current on 
the tongue or vibrations on skin. Individuals who actively explore their sur-
roundings can, with time, come to grasp objects, identify their positions and 
numbers—in short, develop an analogue to vision. Experiments with glasses 
that invert the image hitting the retina suggest a similar point, according to 
Myin and Degenaar (2014), who summarized a number of studies showing 
that 1) people wearing such glasses see normally after five or six days, but that 
2) adaptation is limited when head movement is restricted, highlighting the 
centrality of action and exploration in perception.
This does not obviate the fact that we sometimes look without overtly act-
ing, but it does show that eyes—like hands—are vehicles for action, even if 
we happen to temporarily be sedentary, and suggests that we learn to perceive 
through acting. For Dewey (1934), moreover, it indicates that when the eyes are 
not involved in overt action, seeing is still “an affair of readiness on the part of 
motor equipment” (98). Thus when we see hallways or contours of bottles, we 
see spaces for movements or things we can handle. When we see shape and 
line, we see “ways in which things act upon one another and upon us; the ways 
in which, when objects act together, they reinforce and interfere” (100–101). 
Seeing entails perceiving what sorts of conduct our surroundings allow and 
disallow, as Dewey, with others such as J.J. Gibson (1979), suggested; and when 
we act, as the beer drinking example illustrates, a global assembly of sensi-
tivities and capacities synchronize. On such a basis, Dewey maintained that 
“[n]othing is perceived” unless capacities “work in relation with one an-
other” (175). Looking motivates touching or the reverse, or leads us to crane 
our head to hear, just as a repulsive odor makes us withdraw and so on. Our 
eyes and other  modalities accordingly work in concert with motor capaci-
ties, as when a siren turns our head; or limbs collaboratively work pedals and 
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a  steering wheel to keep a car on the road seen ahead. When counting change, 
 perusing  magazines, typing and so on, “[m]otor and sensory structure form 
a single  apparatus and effect a single function” (255). If an object stimulates 
only one organ, say, the eye, then “experience is thin and poor.” However, 
“[w]hen the tendency to turn the eyes and head is absorbed into a multitude of 
other  impulses and it and they become members of a single act,” then “percep-
tion”—as opposed to “some specialized reaction”—“occurs” (256; emphasis 
added).
This picture of perception, which is also emphasized by Noë (2004), who 
wrote that “perception is a mode of activity on the part of the whole animal” 
(111), counters some putative cases of perceptual breakdown. Some reporters, 
for example, discussing research (see Zampini and Spence, 2004) showing that 
chips seem extra crispy when people hear crackling, have intimated that per-
ception is untrustworthy. The problem, however, is that this conclusion fails to 
recognize that a food is crispy not solely because it fragments easily, but also 
because it has a certain a look, sound and manner of mobilizing the jaw and 
tongue—an overall way of synchronizing sensitivities and actions. Indeed, it 
is actually when capacities fail to coordinate into joint action by synchronizing 
around things that perception tends to fail.
As a case in point, Merleau-Ponty (1945) cited Aristotle’s observation (see 
Dreams 460b20) that one object feels like two when placed between crossed 
fingertips. Here, wrote Merleau-Ponty, “the synthesis of […] tactile perceptions 
in one single object is impossible.” It is because “the crossing of the fingers, 
being a movement which has to be imposed on them,” interferes with their 
 “motor possibilities,” so that “the right face of the middle finger and the left 
face of the index cannot combine in joint exploration of the object” (205; em-
phasis added). Other perceptual illusions are similar. Consider the McGurk 
effect: the finding that dubbing the sound /ba/ onto lip movements for /ga/ 
results in most people hearing /da/ (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). In this 
instance, subjects confront conflicting stimuli that pull sensitivities and ca-
pacities out of synchrony. Seen thus, the McGurk effect is not a consequence of 
something being wrong with subjects, but something being amiss in the situ-
ation in which they are placed. Furthermore, if we start with the assumption 
that perception is intermodal, which is affirmed by Dewey, Merleau-Ponty and 
at least hinted at by enactivists, we cannot even conclude that subjects misper-
ceive the sound, for on this assumption, the isolated ear is not the arbiter of 
what they ought to hear.
Something similar, albeit more emphatic, can be said of Dawkins’s example 
of timbre. The notion that we are deceived when we perceive the brassy sound 
of a trumpet rather than the separate harmonics follows only because Dawkins 
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stipulates without justifying the basis that an accurate way to  perceive is to 
have the soundscape teased apart into fragments. Dewey, by contrast, suggest-
ed that things only have properties in relation to one another and that humans 
are part of the relation, whether in the case of first hand inquiry or scientific 
investigation; he maintained further that action produces the specific phe-
nomena registered. For this reason and ones to be elaborated upon, it makes 
no more sense to claim we are deceived when perceiving brassy timbres than 
it does to claim we are when registering the smoothness of a bottle we are 
handling or indeed detecting separate harmonics with technical instruments. 
All these phenomena result from specific action-scenarios. If judged according 
to specific scenarios generating them, there is no basis for concluding we are 
duped when we register them.
v Dewey’s Theory of Embodied Cognition
Dewey’s theory of perception, along enactivist lines, has at its basis skilled en-
gagement with the world, a point emphasized when he said experience is art, 
and art the skill of the pilot, carpenter and so on (see Dewey, 1925, 354). This 
relates to his understanding of cognition, which he did not view as fundamen-
tally distinct from perception. “To maintain, to expand, adequate function is 
[the] business” of life, wrote Dewey (1908, 48); and “the business of organic 
adaptation involved in all knowing [is] to make a certain difference in reality” 
(47). Living and knowing both involve “co-operative and readjusted changes in 
the cosmic medium” (p. 48; cf. Thompson, 2007, 128).
Here Dewey’s use of “cosmic” corresponds roughly to the ancient Greek 
word kosmos, which might be translated as “orderly system,” and his statement 
expressed what physicists of his day were coming to realize: that illuminat-
ing a system so that it can be seen and known actually disturbs the system. In 
quantum physics this is emphatically so, for as Dewey (1929) noted, at least one 
photon of light “is required to make, say, an electron visible,” and the collision 
between the two “displaces to some extent the object observed” (204). The les-
son Dewey drew is that knowing—as a variety of experience—is a “kind of 
interaction that goes on within the world” (204–205), so that “[w]hat is known 
is […] a product in which the act of observation,” which is an act of rearrange-
ment, “plays a necessary role” (204).
In this regard, quantum mechanics is almost commonsensical, for we fre-
quently observe things by changing or manipulating them. When “trying to 
make out the nature of a confused and unfamiliar object,” wrote Dewey (1929), 
we “turn it over, bring it into a better light, rattle and shake it, thump, push 
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and press it” (87). Or if we cannot directly jostle it, we “deliberately alter the 
 conditions under which we observe [it]” (84). Either way we “make changes 
which will elicit some previously unperceived qualities” (87). Thus inquiring—
like perceiving—is an act of going out in order to receive. This means, on the 
one hand, that we garner observations from the world in return for acting upon 
it; and, on the other, that what we receive is of little worth when we fail to 
act within certain limits. Using ill-suited instruments, ignoring constraints of 
materials and banging about randomly will elicit observable effects, but the 
relationships between them will likely appear haphazard and meaningless.
This reiterates Dewey’s rationale for characterizing “knowing” in terms of 
art or skilled doing—a characterization that obviously mirrors his and enac-
tive accounts of perception. Carpentry is an art, and someone is an artisan, 
Dewey (1920) explained, only if “he notes things not just as objects in them-
selves, but with reference to what he wants to do to them and with them; to 
the end he has in mind” (114–115). The end, if it is to be achieved, limits what 
materials can be used, and the materials limit how the carpenter can deploy 
his skills. Consequently he acquires the habit of seeing things in terms of pos-
sible actions and uses:
Fitness to effect certain special changes that he wishes to see accom-
plished is what concerns him in […the materials] he observes. His atten-
tion is directed to the changes they undergo and the changes they make 
other things undergo so that he may select that combination of changes 
which will yield him his desired result (115).
So when the carpenter calls pine “a softwood,” he indicates pine is easy to sand 
and hammer nails into, but also easy to scratch and thus not appropriate for 
kitchen floors. From his standpoint, things and their properties “are what they 
can do and what can be done with them,” and “[i]t is only by […] active ma-
nipulation of things in order to realize his purpose that he discovers what the 
properties of things are” (115).
In these various examples properties appear not only in consequence 
of what observers do, but in consequence of “changes [things] make other 
things undergo” (Dewey 1920, 115). Dewey’s point, therefore, is one hinted at 
in Peirce’s pragmatic maxim (see Peirce, 1878, 293) and emphasized by oth-
er leading thinkers of his day, for example, Nietzsche (1967 [c. 1885–1886], 
§557) and Merleau-Ponty (1945, 1947): that properties are effects of relation-
ships. Dewey’s analysis suggests, among other things, that the distinction be-
tween so-called “secondary” properties such as color and “primary” ones such 
as length and mass is misleading. It is misleading, to extrapolate just a little 
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 beyond Dewey who in fact drew insights from Einstein’s theories of relativity 
(see Dewey, 1929, chapters 5, 6), because an object’s color, length and mass all 
depend on its velocity relative to the point of observation. As with color, there-
fore, length and mass—mass here understood as resistance to acceleration—
are not determinable properties of isolated entities, but effects of relationships 
between them (see Crippen, 2010 497).
With something like this in mind, Dewey (1925) insisted that perceived 
qualities are not mere representations “in” the sensate organism, but rather 
“qualities [or effects] of interactions in which both extra-organic things and 
organisms partake” (259), more or less anticipating O’Regan and Noë’s (2001, 
960) thesis that qualitative aspects are features of our activity. Thus, as Dewey 
(1908) elaborated, qualities such as “red, or far and near or hard and soft, or 
big and little” are undeniably relative (45). They are so, however, in the literal 
sense that they involve “a relation between organism and environment,” which 
by pushing back limits what the organism can do, and this is no basis for “proc-
lamations of the agnostic ‘relativity’ of knowledge”; it is “an argument for the 
ultimately practical value of distinctions.” Distinctions “are differences made 
in what things would have been without organic behavior—differences made 
not by ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind,’ but by the organism as the active center of a 
system of activities” (45).
The combination of this system of activities and the active organism can 
be thought of as a situation. Situations in Dewey’s sense of metaphysically 
broader, so that living in Cairo, with all its physical and cultural affordances 
and restraints is a situation, whereas a specific night out on the town is an 
experience (Chudoba, 2017). Situations can be more local as well, but whatever 
the case, situations provide context in which things can show up meaningfully 
(see Dewey, 1938, esp. 66–67). If we are in a kitchen, our situation includes us, 
and likely such things as walls, furniture, sink and stove, and perhaps a cat 
sniffing at our feet. These constituents delineate possibilities of action and 
organization. If we remove, say, the table, we can traverse the space it occu-
pied, but cannot lean our elbows where we once did; nor can the tablecloth 
continue to rest 80 centimeters above the floor. Limits also vary depending 
on the active center. The cat is one such center; a person another. Because the 
two come to the kitchen endowed with different capacities and limitations, 
they face, as the expression goes, different situations. We can imagine, there-
fore, that they perceive their situations differently, yet this is here equivalent 
to “perceiving objectively different situations.” It is equivalent because the cat 
and person face objectively different constraints—they, like the table and sink, 
are able to do different things. It is no mere variation in mental outlook that 
differentiates the perceptual experience of sipping a glass of milk from that of 
lapping from a dish while on all fours. It is a difference in action. If the person 
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caresses a table leg while the cat scratches it, different actions are performed, 
and different actions realize different properties as effects. Easy sweeps of fin-
gertips realize smoothness of lacquered wood, while digging claws realize its 
sinewy toughness, all of which is to repeat: perception and cognition are pre-
eminently a matter of acting and altering worldly arrangements, as opposed to 
merely representing them.
vi Anti-skeptical Implications of Dewey’s Outlook
Dawkins’s views on mind imply a view, which I take to be fairly common in 
scientific circles and also among psychology and philosophy professors. Put 
crudely, the view is that the human mind is feeble. Also implied is that sci-
entists know best, which translates to non-scientific folk are mostly duped. 
Without discounting science, which is after all utilized in the work of Dewey 
and enactivists and to that extent also in this article, I will conclude by detail-
ing how many of Dawkins’s observations, along with Hoffman’s, if read from a 
Deweyan perspective, affirm a position contrary to the one intended.
Dawkins (2006), it will be remembered, stated that there is “simulation soft-
ware in the brain” (89) and that “[w]hat we see … is not the unvarnished real 
world but a model of [it]” (371) built “inside our head” (361). Hoffman (2009, 
2011; and Prakash, 2014), without pushing the idea of simulation software, 
argued that the perceptual system is geared to facilitating interface with the 
world, not producing veridical representations. Like so many others, today 
and through history, both cited perceived hues as an example, with Dawkins 
(2006) calling them “internal labels” (372) having “no intrinsic connection with 
lights of particular wavelengths” (373), which he takes as the genuine reality. 
In Dawkins’s words, perceived hues are “tools” used to construct a “model of 
external reality” that mark “important distinctions in the outside world” (373). 
An animal’s “world-representing software” is adapted to its particular “way of 
life,” and Dawkins accordingly reasoned “that bats may ‘see’ colour with their 
ears.” After all, “[t]he world-model that a bat needs … must surely be similar 
to the model that a swallow needs” (372). Bats may accordingly use hues “as 
internal labels for some useful aspect of echoes,” so that “the nature of the 
model is governed by how it is to be used rather than by the sensory modality 
involved” (372).
I take roughly half of this speculative account to be correct. Enactivist theo-
ries and specifically sensory substitution devices indeed affirm that our expe-
rience of the world is governed in significant degree by action in it, so that 
even conventionally non-visual sensory modalities can become visual in prac-
tice, in line with what Dawkins said, albeit without anything approaching the 
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 experience of hues. Yet this also suggests—and this is the point Dawkins and 
Hoffman missed—that perceptual experience is not merely constructed in 
the head, but built through enacted interrelations. To re-quote Dewey (1925), 
perceived qualities are conceived poorly if reduced to internal representa-
tions since they are also “qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic 
things and organisms partake” (259). This is obviously so for tactile qualities 
such as smoothness, yet no less so for other kinds of properties. Enactivist ac-
counts attest to this. Also attesting to this is the notion that interrelationships 
are epistemically and ontologically primary. That is, they are where things and 
events with specifiable, perceivable and knowable qualities initially and actu-
ally exist. Color, length and mass, all depend on velocity relative to the point 
of observation, which is to say, they are effects that show up only in the con-
text of  interrelations. Consequently before the perceiver arrives, properties are 
already effects; and if effects count as “real,” and are not arbitrarily deemed 
 “unreal” merely because a perceiver participates in the interrelations, then 
there is no reason to grant them less reality than wavelengths of light, which 
also show up as particular wavelengths as an outcome of specific relations and 
indeed actions, for instance, individuals selecting and setting up detecting in-
struments that introduce changes to the phenomena observed.
Consider another example of Dawkins’s (2006) skepticism. In this passage 
he informed readers that:
Science has taught us, against all evolved intuition, that apparently solid 
things like […] rocks are really composed almost entirely of empty space. 
[…] So why do rocks look and feel solid and hard and impenetrable? […] 
Our brains have evolved to help our bodies find their way around the 
world on the scale at which those bodies operate. We never evolved to 
navigate the world of atoms. If we had, our brains probably would per-
ceive rocks as full of empty space. Rocks feel hard and impenetrable to 
our hands because our hands can’t penetrate them. The reason they can’t 
penetrate them is unconnected with the sizes and separations of the par-
ticles that constitute matter. Instead, it has to do with the force fields that 
are associated with those widely spaced particles in ‘solid’ matter. It is 
useful for our brains to construct notions like solidity and impenetrabil-
ity, because such notions help us to navigate our bodies through [the] 
world… (368).
From Dewey’s standpoint, this mostly reduces to the claim that perception 
reflects the situation or relationship we objectively find ourselves acting in, 
and if we were to find ourselves in another, our perception would reflect it. 
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In relation to our bodies, rocks are, objectively speaking, impenetrable. So in 
this instance perception is not duped. Also misleading is Dawkins’s suggestion 
that we perceive rocks as solid primarily because of “evolved intuition.” This 
is an overuse of theoretical machinery, specifically in the form of Darwinism, 
and also an overstatement on the degree to which evolved and in this sense 
hardwired representations determine our view of things. After all, if the rules 
of physics suddenly allow hands to pass through rocks, we will perceive this. 
Actions, in short, trump evolved intuitions and the like. Indeed, it is largely by 
acting on materials in the world—by altering the situations in which they are 
observed—that scientists have reached the conclusion that material objects 
are mostly composed of space, which does not, in any case, contradict our ex-
perience of their solidity for reasons to be discussed.
The error in Dawkins’s interpretation is reminiscent of that of commenta-
tors teaching introductory physics, who sometimes charge that Democritus 
misrepresented reality by claiming atoms are indivisible. In making this claim, 
they neglect the fact that atomas meant “indivisible” and that it was modern-
era scientists who misapplied the term when they initially but wrongly con-
cluded that what they called “atoms” fit this description. Dawkins similarly 
erred when he insinuated we mistakenly call objects “solid” and “impenetra-
ble,” for we rarely use these terms to describe atomic arrangements. Rather, we 
use them to indicate what we can do with things and they to us—something 
Dawkins conceded, without following the point to its pragmatic conclusion. 
Solidly built chairs bear our weight. Impenetrably solid fogs impede vision and 
movement. Unlike liquid or gas, we can handle solid ice, walk on it or risk fall-
ing through it. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) have made com-
parable points throughout their work, as has Merleau-Ponty (1945), and none 
of these linguistic uses of the word “solid” contradicts claims about or even 
says anything about the molecular structure of matter.
As with Dawkins, Dewey (e.g., 1920, 84–86), like James before him (see Crip-
pen, 2010, 2011), acknowledged a debt to evolutionary biology. Like Dawkins 
(2006), moreover, who suggested that concepts are tools for adapting to the 
world (368–372) and that we do not see “the unvarnished real world” (371), 
Dewey regarded concepts as instruments. Consequently Dewey (1920) agreed 
they are not “bare transcript[s] or duplicate[s] of some finished […] arrange-
ment pre-existing in nature” (154), for copying reality is not the chief func-
tion of instruments. Rather, instruments help us negotiate realities, and also 
change them, so that there is no “finished arrangement” to represent. Dawkins 
emphasized some of this. Yet he also stressed that we build models of the 
world “inside our head” (361) and failed to convey, as Dewey (1920) stated, that 
an instrumental view of classification “does not commit us to the notion that 
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classes are […] purely mental” or “merely nominal” (154). It does not because 
our conceptual classes are realized in “objective action” (154).
To sum up, Dewey would agree adaptability is key, but add there is no pre-
existing truth to represent, a point Hoffman acknowledged more readily than 
Dawkins, citing quantum mechanics as a case in point (see Hoffman and 
Prakash, 2014). However, Hoffman’s framing of the discussion is  skeptical—and 
arguably more so than Dawkins’s—insofar as he hinted that we must therefore 
abandon all claims about having genuine access to reality. Hoffman’s discus-
sions are also confused in that he suggested there is no pre-existing truth while 
citing standard examples of objective reality, for example, wavelengths of light 
in order to show that our perception is adaptive but not accurate.  Hoffman 
(2009) argued that perceptual theories should be reoriented from “categories 
of the objective world” to “categories of an organism’s perceptual world” (153), 
unaware these can be the same, as the earlier example of the cat versus human 
illustrate. Here the cat and human live in objectively different worlds because 
they can do different things, which also leads them to have different perceptual 
worlds. Hoffman also said that adaptability trumps truth (151), and challenged 
enactive theories, seemingly unaware that truth and fitness are typically not in 
conflict when judged from an action-based standpoint.
The carpenter’s general distinction, for example, between hard and soft-
wood is realized in how he generally works and builds with lumber. Very lit-
erally, therefore, the distinction is based in human constructions. Yet we do 
not designate houses and other constructed entities as figments of imagina-
tion, so Dewey (1925) warned against rejecting conceptual distinctions as such 
simply because they reflect worldly arrangements we help build (see 181–191). 
Like  artists, elaborated Dewey, we confer “upon things traits … which did not 
previously belong to them” (381). Complaints that this makes knowledge a 
“perversion” reflects “a confusion of tenses. Knowledge is not a distortion … 
which confers upon its subject-matter traits which do not belong to it, but is an 
act which confers upon non-cognitive material traits which did not belong to 
it” (381). Changes resulting from the general uses to which the carpenter puts 
hard and softwoods are objectively realized in schemes of worldly activity.
With action as a starting point, classical pragmatists and especially Dewey 
thus offered theories of mind that challenge the notion, propagated by think-
ers ranging from Descartes and Hume to Dawkins and Hoffman, that the in-
dividual perceiver and thinker does not have genuine access to reality. They 
did so by suggesting, first, that much of what we call cognition goes on outside 
the head; second, that the primary job of perception and cognition is not to 
represent the world, thereby downplaying the importance of representations, 
arguing   instead that the measure is usefulness to life; and, third, that things 
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only have properties in relation to one another and that humans are part of 
the relation, making it nonsensical to conclude that we misperceive when we 
register the solidity of the chair on which we are sitting, or the brassy timbre 
of a trumpet.
Classical pragmatists also challenged traditional epistemologies by suggest-
ing there is rarely one version of reality to which an idea or percept ought to 
correspond (see James, 1878, 921–922). For example, observable spatial rela-
tions between planets accord equally well with the thesis that the solar system 
is heliocentric and the contrary thesis that the Sun orbits the Earth, and the 
other planets the Sun, with background stars annually undulating lockstep 
(see Crippen, 2010, 485–486, 501; Crippen, 2015, 87–89). However, very few to-
day accept the latter view, and for good reason, namely, that fit between facts 
and representations—whether in the form of scientific models or mental 
 entities—is rarely if ever adequate grounds for accepting a theory, as James 
(1907), among others, pointed out. Other bases such as elegance, economy 
and consistency with other accepted beliefs—in short, non-evidential criteria 
that enhance workability—have long been employed in the sciences and else-
where, with James accordingly subtitling his 1907 Pragmatism, “a New Name 
for Some Old Ways of Thinking.” The primacy of workability, which of course 
includes fit with data but only among much else, emphasizes actions and their 
consequences. It also again draws attention to the wrongheadedness of con-
cluding that we are in error when perceiving a brassy timbre of a trumpet, as 
opposed to separate harmonic tones, or when we perceive rocks as solid. More 
than one experience fits brute facts and many are workable in different con-
texts and do not even much of the time contradict one another.
The scientifically informed account of perception and cognition offered by 
classical pragmatists and especially Dewey accordingly helps overcome the 
skepticism that characterizes certain scientific visions, along with Modern era 
accounts of mind that remain in play today. Dewey, with James and others, 
took unequivocal cues from the physical and biological sciences, while also 
anticipating recent turns in cognitive science; and he and his philosophical 
confederates delivered scientifically informed pragmatic frameworks within 
which a compelling case can be made that the individual perceiver and thinker 
is not continually duped.
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